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THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTANT

Richard Primust

The Constitution embodies the deepest values of the
American people. That feature of our political culture is
constant. As a result, the meaning of the Constitution changes
over time. The content of American values changes from
generation to generation, after all. So because the
Constitution constantly embodies our deepest values, the
meaning of the Constitution also changes. It has to, or else
the Constitution would cease to embody the American
people's deepest values.
The proposition that the Constitution embodies the deep
est values of the American people is as robust and stable a
truth as exists in our political culture. It seems to be true all
the time, generation after generation, even in the face of tre
mendous change. American values change; circumstances
change; doctrines and institutions and methods of government
change. But whatever our deepest values are, and whatever we
understand to be our most basic commitments about govern
ment, will reliably be reflected in the Constitution. At any mo
ment, there will be a correspondence between our deepest
values and the meaning of the Constitution as we understand
t Theodore J. St. Antoine Professor of Law, The University of Michigan Law
School.
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it. That correspondence is what I am calling the constitutional
constant.
My claim about the constitutional constant presents a picture of constitutional law different from the one on offer in the
civics-book conception of the Constitution as a precommitment
strategy.11 7 On that familiar view, constitutional law is a system that overcomes pathological decisionmaking at Time 2 by
enforcing the decisions made at a more thoughtful Time 1. For
the system to work that way, the idea goes, the content of the
rules must be constant over time, so that the decision made at
Time 1 is in fact what will be enforced at Time 2. On that
model, change in the meaning of the Constitution over time
would be a fatal flaw.
Constitutional law in practice sometimes works the way
that the civics-book precommitment picture imagines." 8
Much of the time it does not. Over the course of history, and
particularly where the most value-laden constitutional issues
have been concerned, the content of constitutional law has
been a variable rather than a constant, and the relevant
changes have usually come without formal amendments." 9
The relevant variability is not of the kind where any constitutional rule in existence today might be different tomorrow, or
even next year. Most of the time, most things are stable, at
least in the short-to-intermediate run. But over the longer run,
even many fundamental things change substantially. The
scope of federal regulatory power under Article 1,120 the re-

117
See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ("The
powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be
mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written."); see generally JON ELSTER,
ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STuDIES IN RATIONALiIY AND IRRATIONALITY 37-38 (1979)
(discussing general examples of precommitment strategies).
118 To this point in history, for example, Americans have reliably enforced the
Time 1 decision to hold presidential elections every four years, rather than asking
in the face of various political exigencies whether this time we should just skip the
next election.
119 See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of ConstitutionalAmendments, 114
HARv. L. REV. 1457, 1458-59 (2001).
120
Compare Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding Congress did
not have the power to regulate labor conditions), with United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941) (overruling Dagenhartin upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938).
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quirements of due process1 2 1 and equal protection,1 2 2 the nature of protected expression under the First Amendmentl 2 3
and the limitations on firearms regulation under the Secondl 2 4 -all of these have changed over time. In short, and in
contrast to what simple forms of precommitment theory imagine, the content of constitutional rules over long stretches of
time is regularly not a constant. It is a variable.
What is constant is the correspondence between Americans' deepest values and the meaning they attribute to the
Constitution. As Americans came to believe deeply in a cluster
of ideas about free speech and racial discrimination, those
ideas gave content to constitutional law and meaning to the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.1 2 5 To be sure, Americans
regularly disagree with one another about important normative
issues. We disagree about abortion and affirmative action, to
take two easy examples. While those disagreements rage, we
also disagree about what the Constitution directs on those subjects-just as we disagreed about what the Constitution directed with regard to racial segregation during the years when
Americans were deeply divided on that issue. When one side of
such a conflict prevails in the battle for mainstream American
values, the prevailing reading of the Constitution comes to
track the winning side's conception. That prevailing reading,
which is then no longer one side's view of a controversial question but a reflection of the dominant set of American values on
the matter in question, is then regarded as the meaning of the
Constitution.
121

Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a Georgia

sodomy law), with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a Texas
sodomy law as contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
122
Compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding racial segregation in public schools), with Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (declaring racial segregation in public schools unconstitutional).
123
Compare Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (upholding a conviction under the California Criminal Syndicate Act based on involvement with an
organization of Communists), with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
(invalidating, on First Amendment grounds, a conviction under Ohio's criminal
syndicalism statute).
124
CompareUnited States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (allowing a restriction
on transporting certain shotguns when their relationship to the preservation of a
militia could not be shown), with District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570
(2008) (guaranteeing an individual's right to possess a firearm unrelated to serving in a militia).
125
See, e.g., RIcHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 177-233
(1999) (identIfying how European totalitarianism during World War II catalyzed
an American push towards constitutional rights relating to racial equality, free
speech, and open democratic politics).
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A few clarifications are in order here. First, when I speak of
the values or beliefs of Americans, my focus is on what we
might think of as the decision-making class: not a population
of hundreds of millions, but the smaller group of officials, activists, and opinion makers who wield power in the world of ideas
and who most shape the dominant public discourse, certainly
among professionals and probably among a broader public as
well. Second, I do not mean to suggest that even that smaller
population ever exhibits consensus in the sense of unanimous
opinion. When I speak of a prevailing view, or of the deeply
held values of Americans, I mean to refer to relatively broad
agreement within the decision-making class-a state of affairs
in which, within that class of Americans, an opinion is widely
held or at least rarely challenged.1 2 6
Moreover, when I say that the Constitution embodies the
deepest values of the American people, I do not mean to say
that just any values are likely to be read into the Constitution if
Americans are sufficiently committed to them (though that
might be true). Nor do I mean to suggest that constitutional
law traffics only in questions of values (thought that might be
true also). Rendered more precisely, my contention is that
there are two kinds of propositions that become propositions of
constitutional law when the American decision-making class
regards them as sufficiently important and sufficiently salient.
Building upon and partly adapting the work of Charles Black
and Phillip Bobbitt, we can call the two kinds of propositions
structuraland ethical. A structural proposition is one that concerns the nature of, or the relationships among, the institutions of American government.1 2 7 An ethical proposition is one
about the American people's self-conception as a polity; it concerns who we think we are as Americans, or perhaps who we
think we are at our best. 128 Our collective self-conception-our
ethos-changes over time, as do our ideas about what governmental structure would best serve us in light of our ethos and
126

See generally Richard Primus, Public Consensus as ConstitutionalAuthor-

ity, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1207, 1209-10 (2010) (exploring the role of consensus

within the decision-making class in shaping constitutional meaning).
127

See generally CHARLES BIACK, STRUcTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw (1969) (explaining and recommending structural analysis in constitutional
decisionmaklng).
128

See PHILIP

BOBBITI,

CONSTITUTIONAL

FATE: THEORY OF

THE CONsTrUTION

93-119 (1982) (developing the category of "constitutional ethos"); see also Richard
Primus, The Functions of Ethical Originalism, 88 TEx. L. Rsv. 79 (2010) (adapting

Bobbitt's conception so that "constitutional ethos" means the general idea of the
polity's self-conception, rather than just the particular self-conception for which
Bobbitt argued).
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our circumstances. Controversies about structure and ethos
are reflected in controversies about constitutional meaning.
And when there is broad agreement within the decision-making
class about an important matter of governmental structure or a
salient aspect of the American ethos, that agreement is reflected in the content of constitutional law. (The preceding sentence is a more fully specified version of the first sentence of
this essay.)
The correspondence between the content of constitutional
law and the decision-making class's views on important matters of structure and ethos is what I am calling the constitutional constant. At any given time, constitutional law reflects
prevailing views on our most important issues of structure and
ethos, and it does so to the extent that there is broad agreement on the relevant question. The content of the decisionmaking class's commitments on matters of structure and ethos
changes over time. But the correspondence between those
commitments and the content of constitutional law remains.
Whatever an elite American consensus regards as most fundamental to its system of government and its value-laden sense of
the national polity will be understood to be required by, and
embodied in, the Constitution. Indeed, that is why the content
of constitutional law changes over time. Our values change,
and what we require of our government changes. So to maintain the constitutional constant-that is, the correspondence
between the Constitution and our important commitmentsthe meaning of the Constitution changes as well.

Christopher Serkin and Nelson Tebbe argue that lawyers
tend to think of constitutional cases as distinctively important. 129 I agree. But as my discussion of the constitutional
constant may suggest, my sense of the reason why lawyers
think of constitutional cases as distinctively important may
differ from Serkin and Tebbe's.
Serkin and Tebbe take the view that constitutional cases
are deemed important because those cases are constitutional.
On that framing, whether a case is a constitutional case is a
fact independent of the case's perceived importance. I suspect
that most constitutional lawyers would agree. On the most
conventional view, a "constitutional case" is one that raises an
129
NELL

Christopher Serkin & Nelson Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, 101
L. REv. 701 (2016).

COR-
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issue about the meaning of a clause in the Constitution, regardless of the importance of that issue. Serkin and Tebbe do
not specify whether they have that textual criterion for constitutionality in mind or whether, in their view, there is something
else that distinguishes constitutional cases from non-constitutional ones. But whatever it is that makes a case constitutional
in their view, it is apparently something independent of the
perceived importance of the issues it raises. Constitutionality
is the independent variable in their analysis, and the perception of importance the dependent one; the fact of constitutionality makes lawyers think of a case as important.
I suppose things do work that way sometimes. But in my
view, the judgment that a case raises a constitutional issue is
often not independent of a substantive judgment about the
importance of the issue raised. More particularly, the judgment that a case raises constitutional issues is not independent of the profession's sense that the case implicates
fundamental questions about structure or ethos. 3 0 In the year
1890, the state-court prosecution of an unlawyered felony defendant raised no constitutional problem. Today it does.13 1
When the legal profession's prevailing intuitions about what is
fundamental to our constitutional structure and our constitutional ethos change, so does the profession's sense of which
cases raise constitutional issues.
Serkin and Tebbe are accordingly correct, I think, to say
that American lawyers intuitively think of constitutional cases
as distinctively important. But that happens in part because
the cases we intuitively classify as structurally or ethically important get described as "constitutional." The meaning of the
Constitution then adapts: we discover ways to read the Constitution's text so that it speaks to the issues we regard as fundamentally important.1 3 2 As a result, the category of
"constitutional cases" is continually populated with the cases
that strike lawyers as raising the most salient questions of
governmental structure and national ethos. So yes, lawyers

130
Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REv. 1079,
1129-35 (2013).
131 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth, guarantees felony
defendants legal representation even if they cannot afford it).
132
See Primus, supranote 130, at 1095-98 & nn.41-46 (describing constitutional textuality as a continuum along which substantive propositions move as
the legal profession's intuitions about the merits of those propositions changes).
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think that constitutional cases are distinctively important.13 3
But they do so in large part because the distinctively important
cases have a way becoming "constitutional."
Note here how Serkin and Tebbe write about United Steelworkers v. Weber, 3 4 the decision in which the Supreme Court
upheld affirmative action in workplaces covered by Title VII. In
an earlier portion of this conversation, Serkin and Tebbe contended that lawyers and judges pay less attention to text in
constitutional cases than statutory ones.13 5 In response, I suggested that whether judges hew closely to enacted text may
depend more on the stakes of the case than on whether the text
at issue is part of the Constitution or part of the U.S. Code.13 6
Where there is a lot to lose, I argued, judges are more willing to
buck prior authority, including the authority of previously enacted text-and they are willing, when the stakes are high, to
buck not just constitutional text but statutory text as well. As
one of my examples of a high-stakes statutory case in which
the Supreme Court ignored enacted text, I offered Weber. '7
Responding to that example, Serkin and Tebbe agree that the
Weber Court behaved nontextually but deny that Weber exemplifies statutory rather than constitutional interpretation.
Weber, Serkin and Tebbe say, was "constitutionally inflected,"
because the subject matter of affirmative action sounds in the
constitutional category of equal protection.1 3 3 Weber should
therefore be understood as a quasi-constitutional case, they
say, even though it was formally statutory. So in Serkin and
Tebbe's view, Weber's disregard for enacted text supports the
claim that it is in constitutional contexts that judges are prone
to behave nontextually.
I agree that there is a sense in which Weber was a constitutional case, or at least a constitutionalish one. The relevant
133
I mean this in a general way: it is a statement about lawyerly intuitions
toward the big categories of "constitutional cases" and "non-constitutional cases."
When one gets down to particulars, it might turn out that the vast majority of
formally constitutional cases are not distinctively important, except of course to
the people directly affected. See infra note 142 (describing suppression motions
under the Fourth Amendment as typical constitutional cases). For further discussion of this point, see Primus, The Cost of the Text, supra, at 9-10.
134 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
135 See Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 129, at 718-19.
136
See Primus, The Cost of the Text, supranote 133, at 7-11. To be precise, I
suggested that it depends partly on the distinction between high-stakes cases and
low-stakes cases and partly on the distinction between cases in thickly developed
doctrinal areas and cases raising questions of first impression. See id. at 10.
137 Id. at 8.
138 Christopher Serkin & Nelson Tebbe, Mythmaking in ConstitutionalInterpretation: A Response to Primus and Stack, supra, at 4.
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sense of "constitutional" is substantive rather than formal.
What makes affirmative action under Title VII a "constitutionally inflected" issue, to use Serkin and Tebbe's term, is not
merely that affirmative action cases arising under Title VII raise
issues that overlap with the issues raised by cases arising
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The deeper reason why
affirmative action seems "constitutionally inflected" even when
the legal issue in a case is formally statutory is that issues of
racial equality are important to the American constitutional
ethos, and being important to the constitutional ethos is what
makes an issue constitutional. In other words, Weber is substantively constitutional for the same reason that Fisher v.
Texas 3 9 is: because it raises an important ethical issue.1 4 0
Preserving the idea that judges reason nontextually in constitutional cases more than in statutory ones by classifying
formally statutory cases like Weber as substantively constitutional is a perfectly defensible move on its own terms. But it
requires adopting a view of the relevant difference between constitutional and non-constitutional cases that largely tracks a
distinction that I suggested does much of the real work of determining when judges are willing to depart from textual authority: the distinction between ordinary cases and cases
where judges feel there is a lot to lose.141 In other words, the
fact that a case raises high-stakes issues of structure and
ethos has at least two sets of consequences. Judges are more
likely to reason nontextually, and the legal profession is more
likely to regard the case as constitutional. But neither of those
consequences is caused by the other one. Judges in a case like
Weber do not first think, "This case is important, so we regard
it as constitutional," and then proceed to think, "This case is
constitutional, so we might not hew to the text." Instead, it is
the fact that the case raises the high-stakes issue it raises that
drives both the judges' willingness to depart from enacted text
and our intuition that the issue is in some sense constitutional.
I do not mean to suggest that the constitutionality of a case
is always just a consequence of some anterior perception of its
importance. 1 4 2 But the category "constitutional cases" attracts
139

136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).

140

See Primus, supra note 130, at 1132-35 (describing ethos as a basis for

constitutional status).
141
Primus, The Cost of the Text, supra note 133, at 9 & 11.
142 Indeed, I do not think that it is true that (formally) constitutional cases in

general are regarded as particularly important-though of course many are. For
every case in which a court orders a state to recognize same-sex marriage, there
are thousands of cases in which courts adjudicate suppression motions under the

20171

DEBATE

1699

and assimilates the cases that strike lawyers as raising the
most important issues of structure and ethos. Sometimes, as
in Weber, we continue to regard a case as technically nonconstitutional even though we also perceive a sense in which
the case is constitutional. At other times, we develop new readings of the Constitution itself in order to make the Constitution
bear on our most salient questions.14 3 In so doing, we perpetuate one of the intuitions that Serkin and Tebbe identify: that
constitutional cases are distinctively important. After all, the
questions in which we are most invested somehow turn out to
be constitutional questions. As must be true, if the Constitution is always going to embody our most important

commitments.

'4

Serkin and Tebbe's claim that American lawyers think of
constitutional cases as having an especially elevated status is
consistent with my view that Americans constantly reimagine
constitutional law so that it speaks to our most fundamental
Fourth Amendment.

Suppression motions are often important-particularly to

the defendants who raise them. But to the judges who adjudicate them, suppression motions might be important in an ordinary sort of way, rather than in the

special way that same-sex marriage cases were important in the last several
years.

The sense that constitutional cases are distinctively important is thus

driven, I think, by the profession's tendency to let the most salient constitutional
cases color an impression of the entire category.
143 See Primus, supra note 130, at 1095-98 & nn.41-46 (discussing this process of textual reconciliation).

144 Serkin and Tebbe respond to my other leading example of a statutory case
in which the Court departed from enacted text-King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480
(2015)-by arguing that the Court in King actually did pay much closer attention
to the text than it usually does in constitutional cases. And it is true that the
Court engaged closely with the enacted statutory wording in King, though it did so

en route to a decision that refused to give legal force to a key bit of enacted text. I
do not think, however, that the Court's close engagement with enacted text in

King lacks parallels in cases arising under the Constitution. Consider District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), in which the Court held that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to possess certain kinds of firearms. The

Heller Court engaged closely and at great length with the wording of the Second
Amendment, and so did Justice Stevens's Heller dissent. I would agree that
Heller's in-the-weeds engagement with the wording of the Constitution is unusual
in modem constitutional law, and I would further agree that such close engagement with enacted text is more common in statutory cases. But as I have previously argued, I think that much of the explanation for that difference lies with the
fact that statutory cases present more questions of first impression about the
meaning of enacted text than constitutional cases do. Heller was a constitutional
case of first impression regarding the meaning of a constitutional text, and,

presented with that case, the Court engaged with the enacted wording of the
Constitution at least as closely as the King Court engaged with the enacted word-

ing of the U.S. Code.
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concerns. But Serkin and Tebbe have some worries about that
dynamic. One worry is that if Americans code their most important issues as constitutional, there will be a tendency for
those issues to be taken out of ordinary political discussion
and relegated to the domain of professional elites. 145 Another
is that the constitutionalization of the polity's most important
issues raises the stakes of political conflict and reduces the
available space for compromise. 146
The first worry can be understood either as a concern that
courts will decide issues that are better left to the normal political process or as a concern that people who are not constitutional lawyers will shrink from engaging with important issues
because those issues seem to require a refined and technical
treatment that is beyond the abilities of laypeople. On the first
conception, the worry strikes me as reasonable. If prevailing
understandings of the Constitution evolve as the norms of
American elites change, and if courts understand themselves
as authorized to countermand the decisions of other institutions on the basis of their understandings of the Constitution,
then courts will probably decide some number of issues that
are better decided by other institutions. To be sure, people will
differ as to the particulars here, and we would need a robust
theory of judicial review to sort out when courts should and
should not intervene. Over-judicialization is to be avoided, but
so is under-judicialization, and trying to figure out how to avoid
both problems is one of the longer-lived preoccupations of
American constitutional theory.
If Serkin and Tebbe are also worried about the second version of this problem, however, then I do not think I share their
concern. Yes, there is a risk that courts will decide issues that
are better resolved in other forms. But I doubt that the American tendency to understand our most salient questions of
structure and ethos as constitutional questions has the effect
of discouraging people who are not professional constitutional
lawyers from engaging vigorously with those questions. As far
as I can tell, there is a robust lay discourse about guns, gay
marriage, affirmative action, abortion, the Affordable Care Act,
and many other issues denominated "constitutional." If there
is evidence that ordinary Americans, or members of the decision-making class other than lawyers and judges, regularly
decline to express themselves on these matters because they
believe the topics require professionally expert resolution, I am
145
146

Serkin & Tebbe, Mythmaking, supra note 138, at 8.
Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 129, at 776.
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not aware of it. Indeed, I think it at least as likely that broad
public discussion on several of those issues influences the judiciary as it is that the way the issues are discussed by elite
lawyers limits the speech, thought, or activism of other interested Americans.
I do suspect, however, that Serkin and Tebbe are correct to
worry about the other concern they express. Precisely because
Americans intuitively regard the Constitution as embodying
their deepest values, disagreement about constitutional law
can seem like fundamental disagreement. And where disagreement is fundamental, people often find it hard to recognize the
legitimacy of differing views.
In my own view, a polity is generally healthier when the
members of its decision-making class are able, across a relatively broad range of issues, to recognize the legitimacy of different ideas. Indeed, I am attracted to the idea that the
Constitution works best when it is understood to provide for
governance that assumes important disagreement within the
polity, rather than when it is understood to resolve all such.
disagreement. The Constitution, as Holmes remarked, is made
for people of fundamentally different views. 147 But it is also
true, as I noted earlier, that the meaning of the Constitution
adapts over time so as to continually embody the deepest commitments of the American decision-making class. It follows
that Americans are unlikely to see the Constitution as neutral
on the polity's most salient issues. We have fundamentally
differing views, and, much of the time, we each see our views
reflected in the Constitution.
So perhaps the key questions are these: Can members of
the decision-making class recognize the existence of a gap, at
any given time, between their own views on issues of structure
and ethos-even their own fundamental views on those issues-and the views of the American people, or at least those of
the decision-making class, as a whole? Can they recognize,
when such a gap exists, that the text of the Constitution might
not settle the question one way or the other? Put differently, if
two people have different and deeply held views about federal
power or affirmative action, must each one regard the other as
betraying the Constitution? Or can they think that the content
of the Constitution might be indeterminate on the issue that
divides them, at least until such time as one of them succeeds
in persuading the broader polity to adopt one set of views? The
147

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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latter frame of mind is harder to maintain, especially in the
heat of mass politics. But it would surely make for a healthier
constitutional culture.
Serkin and Tebbe worry that by treating the Constitution
as special, Americans raise the stakes of politics in unhealthy
ways. There is a sense in which I think they are right. But
perhaps the problem is less that we treat constitutional issues
as especially important than it is that we treat too many com
mitments as not subject to reasonable disagreement. If we
were better able to tolerate disagreement, we might be better
able to tolerate disagreement about the Constitution. And dis
agreement about the Constitution is not going away, precisely
because of a deep respect in which the Constitution is special:
even as American values change over time, the Constitution
embodies the deepest values of the American people, and when
we disagree about what our values should be, we disagree
about the meaning of the Constitution. That feature of the
Constitution may not be unique; indeed, one could probably
say similar things about at least some other sacred texts that,
for particular communities, have the status of higher law. But
it does seem deserving of the label "special." And to this point
in history, it also seems to have been reliably constant.

